The escalating war between Israel and Hezbollah is an American failure. It is proof that the U.S. fails to understand the way the Middle East works. It is proof that the Biden administration has little grasp of strategy. For almost a year, it engaged in attempts to prevent escalation, and the result is 鈥� escalation. For almost a year, it engaged in attempts to prevent a regional war, and the result is 鈥� a rapidly deteriorating atmosphere that could lead to regional war.

For almost a year, the Biden administration engaged in attempts to prevent escalation, and the result is 鈥� escalation.听

Why the Biden administration wanted to prevent such war is clear, and its basic wish to contain a violent situation is commendable. What鈥檚 less than impressive is the path forward the U.S. carved to achieve such result. It was warned by Israeli officials, time and again, that its policy is unsustainable, and chose to ignore this sober advice. The result 鈥� well, just switch on your favorite TV channel and watch the smoke over northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The rising smoke is the symbolic evaporation of American diplomacy.听

And the short version of a long story. On Oct. 7, Israel鈥檚 enemies, including Hezbollah, had to decide whether to support the attack on Israel. The U.S. issued a clear warning to all deliberating parties: Do not join in 鈥� 鈥淒on鈥檛!鈥�

And it worked, up to a point. They didn鈥檛 initiate a similar full-fledged attack on Israel, but did join in. And they did it by executing a winning strategy: Israel evacuated many of its northern towns. Hezbollah fired rockets and sent deadly drones and thus kept Israel鈥檚 forces busy, and Israel鈥檚 public tense. The IDF was engaged in a southern war over Gaza, and its response to Hezbollah, while often deadly, was restrained. It was restrained by operational limitations, because of the focus on the south, and it was also restrained by the international community 鈥� and especially by the U.S.听

What was the U.S. doing? It was engaged in a futile effort to strike a deal that would end the conflict in Lebanon. The logic behind it seems solid: Why have a war and end it with a deal, when you can have the deal now, without the need for war? If Israel and Hezbollah can accept now what they鈥檇 be forced to accept later, they can get what they want without the bloodshed.听

For Israel, two demands are essential: The firing of rockets must stop, and the forces of Hezbollah must move northward so as to guarantee a wide enough buffer zone between them and the Israeli border. The Oct. 7 massacre presented Israelis with a clear picture of what might happen when hostile forces are stationed within a striking distance. Northern residents would not go back home unless their safety is warranted. They will no longer accept a reality of Hezbollah operators walk freely just across the border fence.

Would Hezbollah agree to such an arrangement? It is a cunning and resilient force and would compromise under one condition: a credible threat that would make partial defeat more logical than rejectionism. But the U.S., rather than giving it reasons to worry about defeat, gave it reasons to hope for better terms. By restraining Israel 鈥� and restraining from issuing credible threats of American involvement 鈥� it was hinting to Hezbollah that a bet on a war of attrition would make sense. Israel cannot retaliate with full force when the U.S. doesn鈥檛 even pretend to have skin in the game. Hezbollah鈥檚 choice was almost obvious: Keep fighting now and see if compromise is needed later.

This worked until Israel鈥檚 patience ran out. This worked until Israel decided to … well … not ignore American advice but rather interpret it differently. The U.S. never had any real leverage over Hezbollah, and a few weeks ago it lost some of its leverage over Israel. Not because Israel no longer needs or craves U.S. support. It does. But U.S. support is not the only factor Israeli leaders must consider. They also must consider their urgent need to have a resolution for the northern crisis 鈥� a resolution that must meet the basic conditions for a safe return home of Israel鈥檚 northern residents. Israel is a democracy, as Americans are reminded time and again. In a democracy there鈥檚 a limit to the patience and restraint a leader can force on the public. And that limit was crossed. Israel鈥檚 leaders decided to act.

The response of U.S. officials was, again, less than impressive. Murmurs about the need for more diplomacy, hints that the U.S. still pressures Israel to refrain from using its full force, teach us that a year of schooling did not result in better education. Diplomacy did not prevent war 鈥� it prolonged the period of fighting. Diplomacy did not convince the parties to compromise 鈥� it merely gave them a whole year to exchange fire before they turn to total war.听

It is time for the U.S. to say that the time for diplomacy is over. It is time for the U.S. to signal to all enemies that Israel will be well supplied and fully backed as it goes to war. Maybe 鈥� just maybe 鈥� this could do the trick. Maybe this would finally present Hezbollah with a real choice, rather than a fake one.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

What will be considered a victory in Lebanon? Achieving victory can come in two ways, with many shades of gray in between. One can set a very ambitious goal, achieve it, and thus win. One can set a modest goal, achieve it more easily, and also win. A common difficulty arises when, for political reasons, our leaders set an ambitious goal but actually aim for a modest goal. This is the case in which the public gets confused. The country wins (if we win) and the public is still disappointed.

A week’s numbers

So, Israelis didn鈥檛 yet switch to the other camp of global alliances (nor will they, anytime soon).

A reader’s response

Ami Stein wrote: 鈥淪hmuel, you used to be more upbeat about the future of Israel. We need you to rediscover your optimism.鈥� Response: Yes, I need it too. 听