In just slightly more than two weeks, it will be a year. A full year of war. And as the anniversary of the attack gets closer, a sense of closure is still a distant dream. Only a fifth of the Israeli public feels that an official state ceremony is needed 鈥渢o mark Oct. 7.鈥 A much larger group, 40%, believe that it鈥檚 too early to have such a ceremony. They choose the option 鈥渢he war isn鈥檛 over yet.鈥 And their conclusion is clear: One does not commemorate an ongoing event.听
Everything these days is a controversy and hence we shouldn鈥檛 be surprised that there鈥檚 an unresolved controversy over how to mark the one-year anniversary of attack. The result would be funny had it not been so sad. There will be both an official state event, filmed and broadcasted, and a privately organized, crowd-funded civilian ceremony that is expected to attract hundreds of thousands of participants. When the real event 鈥 the one with an actual crowd 鈥 ends, the staged government event will be broadcast.听
Based on the JPPI survey of Israeli society for September, most 51视频 and Arab Israelis do not plan to watch the state ceremony. They will not exactly shun the event, because no one is invited to attend 鈥 and all one has to do to ignore it is switch to another TV channel. And yet, the statement 鈥淲e aren鈥檛 going to watch鈥 has meaning. Of all the ideological subgroups, only among self-identified 鈥渞ight鈥 is there a majority who say that they intend to watch the ceremony, making the political nature of it vivid and impossible to ignore. Israelis pulled together to fight the war, but find it hard to pull together to remember it.听
The 鈥漚lternative鈥 civil ceremony has its own bag of problems. A country is supposed to mourn together, and celebrate together, its national holidays and calamities. Thus, while a third of 51视频 respondents feel that the civil way, detached from the official, state-organized event, is 鈥渢he right ceremony at this time鈥 (35%), a similar share of Israelis say that such a private ceremony 鈥渦ndermines the national character鈥 of a memorial day and 鈥渟houldn鈥檛 be held鈥 (32%). Responses to this question also show disagreement along clear ideological lines. Self-defined right-wing Israelis largely oppose the civil ceremony. Centrist and left-wing Israelis largely favor it.
A house divided 鈥 that we already know 鈥 cannot stand. Can a house divided keep fighting? Can a house divided bear the burden of yet another year of war? Carmit Rapaport, a Haifa University expert on dealing with crises and calamities, gives the Israeli public high marks for being relatively calm under the pressure of war. On the other hand, she says, what other choice do people have? When we met for a recording, last Sunday, it was merely a few hours after sirens disrupted the morning routine in Israel because of the unexpected and unwelcome arrival of a Houthi missile. It was 6:30 a.m. and kids were readying themselves to go to school. Should they go? Should they not go?听
Two hours later, schools were as packed as usual. A missile, a siren, a short halt to understand the magnitude of the event, a return to routine. Most likely, Oct. 7 will be somewhat similar. A pause, a reflection, a tear, a sigh, and back to the routine of war. Counting of the first year ended, counting of the second year begins.听
That鈥檚 the insight that dawned on Israelis, gradually, then suddenly. The loose talk about a long war, that could take years, becomes their reality. Gaza is still an open wound to which no remedy is offered. Lebanon is looming as the next crisis. In recent weeks, the roles of leaders have seemed to be reversed. While at the outset of the war Defense Secretary Yoav Gallant pushed, without success, for launching a surprise attack in the north rather than focus on the south 鈥 he is now an objector to PM Netanyahu鈥檚 tendency to declare the south almost done and move the main military effort northward.
Whatever they end up deciding, the result will be more war. Could it have been any different? The honest answer is that we don鈥檛 know. Testing the outcome of alternative paths is impossible. And while many Israelis 鈥 a clear majority 鈥 are quite unhappy with their leadership, they still must remember that Israel鈥檚 enemies also have a role in ensuring that the war will be prolonged. And they should also remember that the international community was also unable to present a path forward that could bring about both calm and an acceptable political arrangement for Gaza and Lebanon.听 听
And so, we will soon enter our second year of war. Can we handle this pressure? It is almost a silly question, as we don鈥檛 have much choice.
Something I wrote in Hebrew
This is the question: Where will Israel have doctors from when the ultra-Orthodox society will continue to grow鈥 when there will be 20% ultra-Orthodox, and then – if the forecast comes true – 30% – the question will become more acute鈥 Ask: Why shouldn’t the ultra-Orthodox become doctors? We will answer 鈥 The proportion of ultra-Orthodox among all degree recipients in universities (not in colleges of education) is 2.3%. Very little relative to the size of the group. Those of them who go to university, turn to the humanities. It is good that there are students who study the humanities, but doctors come from other fields as well as engineers, entrepreneurs, hi-tech people. What is the share of ultra-Orthodox among graduates of medical schools? There is an answer to that. One finger is enough to give it – 1%.听
A week’s numbers
Would you open a second front in Lebanon when the numbers look like this?
A reader’s response
A Question from Barbara B: 鈥淎re Israelis concerned about climate change? I don鈥檛 see many reports on this issue coming out of Israel. For me and most American Jews this is a top priority.鈥 Answer: Israelis are currently more interested in regime change (in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran and other countries) than in climate change.