They call it 鈥渢he last chance鈥� but we know it is not the last chance. It is possibly an opportunity to somewhat advance the ongoing negotiations for a hostage deal. And of course, they call it 鈥渁 hostage deal,鈥� but many Israelis would call it 鈥渁 deal of surrender鈥� or just 鈥渁 bad deal.鈥� Because the hostage deal doesn鈥檛 include just an exchange of people 鈥� Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. It includes much more. It includes the halt of war.听

The hostages are the pawns in this dreadful game. The war is the real issue.听

The U.S. and most moderate Sunni Arab countries want it to end, because of the human toll, and because of the growing potential for an eruption of a larger, regional war (as I write this column, the expected attack by Iran and Hezbollah on Israel has not yet materialized).听

Hamas wants it to end while still standing on its feet. And it does currently stand on its feet. Badly wounded, badly damaged, but it seems to still be able to restore its rule over Gaza.听

Israel wants it to end with Hamas out. But it doesn鈥檛 quite say what the alternative arrangement in Gaza would be. It mentions 鈥渁 local Palestinian force鈥� but has none to present as a potential candidate for the mission.听

As all parties gather to search for a path for a deal, Israel is the one who can鈥檛 quite clarify its position. Maybe it鈥檚 because the stakes for Israel are higher (compared to the mediators), maybe it鈥檚 because Israel is the bubbling democracy where all views get to be aired (compared to Hamas), and maybe because Israel is the one in which real differences of opinion exist. There鈥檚 the camp of 鈥渓et鈥檚 get them back first and go back to worry about Hamas second,鈥� and there鈥檚 the camp of 鈥渓et鈥檚 keep our eyes on the ball 鈥� Israel must annihilate Hamas.鈥�听

Both these schools of thought can present a rationale in support of their views, but both camps assume that the rationale of the other side is merely a mask behind which there is a layer of unstated objectives and sentiments. In the 鈥渉ostages first鈥� camp there are many who suspect that the right-wing coalition and the PM don鈥檛 much care about the hostages and want to prolong the war, because of 鈥� among other things 鈥� political considerations (the war is the glue that keeps the coalition together). In the 鈥渕ust win first鈥� camp there are many who suspect that the center-left and the higher command of the IDF don鈥檛 have the spine needed for a win. They suspect that there are factions of people who no longer believe that victory is possible.听

This debate made itself visible in the most undesired fashion on Monday, when Israel鈥檚 Defense Minister and Israel鈥檚 PM 鈥� the two men managing the war 鈥� attacked each other while the nation watched in astonishment. Defense Minister Gallant mocked the 鈥渘onsensical鈥� notion of 鈥渢otal victory鈥� 鈥� the one PM Netanyahu vowed to achieve. The PM retorted with a statement blaming the Defense Minister for adopting 鈥渢he anti-Israel narrative.鈥� To say this is no proper way to run a war is stating the obvious. That the two men are barely on speaking terms is an established fact. We have proof, from March 2023, that they are stuck together because an attempt by the PM to replace the DM could wreak havoc. But they also disagree. Simply disagree. Netanyahu believes that Israel can keep pushing for a better outcome of the war, while Gallant believes that it is time to wrap it up and begin a process for restoring calm.听

They can both make their case, and both must face tough questions. Netanyahu isn鈥檛 clear about the meaning of victory and is even less clear about the arrangement he proposes for Gaza. His strategy could inflame a broader war 鈥� and not all Israelis believe such war would serve Israel鈥檚 long-term interests. And of course, there are the hostages. Bringing them home is a moral imperative. Then again, the Gallant path is also far from being smooth and clear. Can Israel end the war with Hamas still in power? Can it end the war with Hezbollah forces on its border? Is it realistic to believe that the deal will be just a phase after which the war could be renewed?

As we follow the 鈥渓ast chance鈥� attempt to make a deal and its outcome, we must remember that while its clear that outcome is good for the hostages and their families, and while its clear what all of us must rejoice with the hostages and their families when they are released 鈥� it is more complicated to decide what outcome is good for the future of Israel. Our society is torn apart over the terms of a potential hostage deal. And while this looks like a political debate 鈥� because, for multiplicity of reasons, the two opposing camps seem to mirror the coalition and the opposition 鈥� it is not just that. It is also a substantial debate over the most difficult strategic dilemmas facing Israel.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Israel鈥檚 Justice Minister proposed to his coalition colleagues to return to his controversial initiative from last year of reforming the legal system. Here鈥檚 what I wrote:

It is difficult to explain this development without degenerating into psychological explanations 鈥� of course 鈥� this is madness. Regardless of whether the coalition’s claims against the Attorney General and the courts are just claims (and some of them are), regardless of whether there is a need to reform (and there are things that need to be reformed), it is clear that anyone who wants to burden Israeli society with this additional controversy in a time of war 鈥� is not a conservative. He is closer to a Marxist. Conservatism means caution, means progress in measured steps鈥� going back to the reform is the least prudent act that can be thought of in the circumstances of Israel today.

A week鈥檚 numbers

The monthly index of Israel鈥檚 society by JPPI demonstrates, among other things, the rise in attributing 鈥�51视频 value鈥� to serving in the IDF among secular Israeli Jews.

A reader鈥檚 response:

Rafi Elihu asks: Do we know how many hostages are still alive? Answer: no, and it鈥檚 not clear if Hamas itself has an exact number. Most estimations you can find, by experts and officials, are between 30 and 70. 听

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner鈥檚 Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.