“How dare you go to war when all conditions are now against us? How dare you?! No power will support us … We will have to fight on two fronts and maybe three. Even the United States does not support us … we will have no weapons supply if we run into shortages during the war.鈥�

The speaker: The leader of the religious Zionist Party, Moshe Haim Shapira. The reprimanded officer: Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin. The time: The so-called “waiting period,” a tense three weeks between the time in which Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and the breakout of the 1967 Six Day War.听

Israel was under pressure; the Chief of Staff was under pressure. Historians have more than one interpretation concerning Rabin’s eventual 鈥渃ollapse鈥� under pressure. There was Rabin’s version, and there was Air Force Chief and future president Ezer Weizman’s. The short biography on Rabin written by Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, undoubtedly a very sympathetic writer (he was a close advisor to Rabin in his second term as Prime Minister), beautifully describes the increasing burden on Rabin. Former PM David Ben-Gurion shouts at him; Defense Minister Moshe Dayan makes life difficult for him; Shapira presses him. When politicians are under pressure, they tend to pass it on to those in charge of military affairs.听

“The three meetings took a heavy toll on Rabin,” Rabinovich wrote. He tends to accept Rabin鈥檚 version. His wife Leah, believing her husband must get some rest, called a medical officer who sedated Rabin. He slept for the next 24 hours, and then went back to work. The waiting period was tense. In retrospect it turned out that Israel’s anxieties were overstated. Within six days it defeated its enemies. Of course, the parallels stop here. No one expects such a rapid victory in a war against Hezbollah, Yemen and Iran, which would be an unwelcome addition to the war with Hamas. As I write these words, a war hasn鈥檛 started. By the time you read them, who knows what鈥檚 going to happen.

As I write these words, a war hasn鈥檛 started. By the time you read them, who knows what鈥檚 going to happen.听

Back in 1967, Israel had a cautious political leadership and an energetic military leadership. General Ariel Sharon hoped that a war would convince the Egyptians not to fight Israel “for the next 10 or 20 years” (as described by historian Tom Segev). Sharon was right in his realization that Israel can bring about “the total destruction of the Egyptian forces.” Sharon was wrong in his assessment that a heavy blow, such as the one delivered by Israel in the Six Day War, would indeed deter the Egyptians for 10 or 20 years. It deterred Egypt for no more than two. Which tells us something about the limits of two common clich茅s that we hear a lot these days 鈥� that restraint is a positive attribute of policy, and that deterrence is an effective tool of policy.

Would it have been better for Israel if the days of that long waiting period, on the eve of the Six Day War, had been used to prevent the war? Would the situation in the Middle East have been better if the Johnson administration had been more resolute, more determined, in its dealings with the Egyptians and the Syrians? Alternative history is fun, but not quite serious fun. The war would not have broken out, Israel would not have won 鈥� with alternative history, all bets are off. Perhaps the future would have progressed in the direction of reconciliation and peace, perhaps the continuation would have been a more difficult war under more difficult conditions a few years later. And here, trying to draw a parallel is possible. It is difficult to say emphatically what would be more beneficial to Israel: A major flare-up that would reshuffle all the cards in the Middle East, or maybe Israel鈥檚 interest is to have a limited exchange of blows, the result of which would be the preservation of the existing balance of power?

Would it have been better for Israel if the days of that long waiting period, on the eve of the Six Day War, had been used to prevent the war?听

The existing balance of power is unstable. Sticking to it probably means more rounds of violence in the future, perhaps on better terms for Israel, perhaps not.

Shortly after the Oct. 7 attack, the Israeli cabinet faced a dilemma. Israel鈥檚 north was evacuated because of the understandable fear of a massacre of Israelis who live by the Lebanese border. Israel鈥檚 troops were facing south, as the need to fight Hamas was obvious. Hezbollah 鈥� warned and undeterred by President Biden鈥檚 鈥渄on鈥檛!鈥� speech 鈥� assessed that it could act with relative impunity against Israel.听

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant smelled an opportunity. Hamas is a small player. Hezbollah is the much larger fish. Maybe Israel ought to turn a calamity into an opportunity and attack in the north rather than the south?听

Prime Minister Netanyahu and the cabinet debated and rejected Galant鈥檚 proposal. The other ministers had three main objections: One 鈥� Hamas was the enemy that Israelis wanted to fight, and fighting on two fronts is a challenge. Two 鈥� Hamas is the enemy whose defeat seemed more realistic, and Israel wanted a clear show of its ability to eliminate an enemy. Three – fighting Hezbollah could mean a flare-up of a regional war, and the U.S. put immense pressure on Israel to not act in a way that would increase the likelihood of such a war.听

And so, a status quo emerged: Hezbollah barraged Israel daily, in a fashion reminiscent of the war that came after the Six Days War 鈥� the 1969-1970 War of Attrition. With time, Yemenite radicals joined the party and contributed their rockets. And in April, Iran took the most visibly aggressive step against Israel in its history and sent hundreds of flying explosive devices to Israel. Israel鈥檚 response on all fronts was limited. It aimed to contain the violence and focus on Hamas.

A status quo emerged: Hezbollah barraged Israel daily, in a fashion reminiscent of the war that came after the Six Days War 鈥� the 1969-1970 War of Attrition.

Was this decision, to refrain from igniting a broader flareup, a mistake? Again 鈥� we can toy with alternative histories, but it all leads to dead ends. The downside of the current situation is clear: Hezbollah and Iran are exactly where they want to be. They can harass Israel without the need to worry about grave consequences. Israel does not want a larger war; they don鈥檛 want a larger war. But that鈥檚 just a headline below which a sub-headline is necessary:听 Israel doesn鈥檛 want a larger war 鈥� and expects hostilities to end. Iran and Hezbollah do not want a larger war 鈥� and aim for hostilities to continue. Israel鈥檚 hands are tied 鈥� by operational limits, by its need to remain focused on Gaza, by its allies. The hands of its enemies are relatively free. They need to make sure of just one thing: To keep their action under a certain unspecified level of violence. Killing twelve boys in the Golan Heights 鈥� that鈥檚 the kind of error they want to avoid, as it forces Israel to respond more vigorously to the attacks, and forces them to respond to the response, and could force Israel to reconsider the status quo of harassment.

The downside of the current situation is clear: Hezbollah and Iran are exactly where they want to be. They can harass Israel without the need to worry about grave consequences.

What does Israel really want? I鈥檓 going to take a short detour before we conclude.听

There are two competing historical narratives describing the actions of King Henry VIII (the one known for his six wives). One presents him as a hedonistic and shallow king, manipulated by advisers, 鈥渋nept,鈥� torn between competing factions; the other presents him as cunning, as 鈥渢he motivating force behind all important policies.鈥� Each of them is based on documents and testimonies. Each of them depends, in the end, on the decision of whoever writes the history of Henry VIII’s reign in the 16th century.

Historian Lucy Wooding, whose book on the King I am reading during the 2024 Waiting Period, ruled in favor of the king. That is, she argues that Henry was 鈥渕aking use of factions, rather than factions making use of the king.鈥� Wooding believes that presenting Henry as a puppet of his advisors was mainly due to political or propaganda needs. When he did something unpopular, it was convenient to blame someone else. It’s not his fault 鈥� it’s Anne Boleyn’s. It’s not his fault 鈥� it’s Thomas Cromwell’s.听

You can read this biography and reflect on Benjamin Netanyahu’s image. After all, there are also two similar narratives about his actions and decisions in recent weeks and months. And if I may guess, these two interpretations will continue to resonate in future histories of Israel. The historian of year 2524 is going to have to weigh them. One contends that Netanyahu is the leader whose wishes are decisive, the one who steers the country in the direction he is aiming for. The other contends that the PM is a puppet, manipulated by his much more radical coalition partners, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir. They control him, because of their power to maintain or overthrow the coalition.

The one side contends that Netanyahu is a decisive leader who steers the country in the direction he desires. The other contends the PM is a puppet, manipulated by his much more radical coalition partners, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.听

Does Netanyahu want an end to the war, a hostage deal, a cessation of hostilities? Or does he not want a hostage deal, want to escalate the war, believe that the battle must continue? We know what Netanyahu says, we see what he does, we hear what his coalition partners advise or pressure him to do. But with all this evidence the debate could not be resolved. Much like the case of Henry VIII, there鈥檚 Wooding’s argument for Netanyahu as the master of strategic goals, and there鈥檚 a competing case for Netanyahu as the puppet of political considerations. Netanyahu’s heart and mind are a black box. None of those who look at him from the outside know for certain what he is thinking, what considerations really motivate him.

Netanyahu’s heart and mind are a black box. None of those who look at him from the outside know for certain what he is thinking, what considerations really motivate him.听

Netanyahu’s opponents, his many critics, believe that he is motivated by political reasons. He wants to calm down Ben-Gvir. He wants to prolong the war to postpone elections. He wants to take a position that suits the political “base.” The opponents believe 鈥� and this is the harshest verdict a public can reach concerning a leader 鈥� that the PM deliberately and mischievously prolongs the war, not for the strategic reasons he keeps voicing, but for purely political reasons.听

Of course, Netanyahu’s supporters vehemently disagree with such allegation or conclusion. They see substantive reasons for his actions and decisions. Netanyahu insists on victory, while his opponents are getting ready to cave. Netanyahu resists U.S. pressure to stop short of achieving Israel鈥檚 objectives, while his opponents are quick to accept unreasonable demand.听

It is difficult for both sides to admit that, indeed, there are two types of reasons for doing what the government does. It is difficult for both sides to admit that indeed, there is no way to know which of the two is the decisive one in Netanyahu鈥檚 mind. Israelis鈥� position is determined not by the evidence, but rather according to their predetermined position: those who are suspicious of the PM assume that his main objectives are political. Those who are less suspicious of him accept his strategic arguments.听

Israel is kicking the can down the road. The U.S. is kicking it down the road. The world is kicking many cans down the road.听

The 鈥渃an鈥� was Hamas 鈥� it was kicked down the road from 2007, when it took over Gaza, to 2024.听

The 鈥渃an鈥� is Hezbollah 鈥� it was kicked down the road from the 2006 Lebanon war, to 2024.听

The 鈥渃an鈥� is the Houthis in Yemen, and it is the belligerent, revolutionary, Iran.听

Kicking a can down the road tends to be used as a negative description of inaction. Instead of deciding, one kicks the can. Oftentimes, the result is calamity, because problems don鈥檛 just disappear when countries and leaders ignore them. Israel decided that Hamas in power could be contained by a mixture of deterrence and bribe. It decided not to launch a costly preventive war to stop Hamas from becoming more powerful. In retrospect it is easy to see that Israel was wrong to make this calculation. But imagine the opposite policy. Imagine Israel deciding, in 2009 or 2016, to go to war whose aim is to uproot Hamas. Would Israelis support it? Would the international community support it? And just remember, this is the same international community that never took the extra step necessary to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. It is the same international community that lets the Houthis terrorize passing cargo ships. 听

Kicking the can has a bad name, but not bad enough to make it disappear as a policy, because it鈥檚 convenient for leaders and publics, because it鈥檚 easier to sell, because sometimes it does work. Sometimes buying time is the best option one has. And sometimes 鈥� if rarely – challenges are indeed resolved by the mere passage of time. Since no one seems to want a war, and until someone decides to risk a war, the noise you hear, it is just an empty can.

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner鈥檚 Domain at .